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Friedman Rule breaks up only if agents prefer late resolution of uncertainty. However, if
an additional role of money as a medium of exchange is introduced, then the Friedman
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of uncertainty resolution. The aggregate output uncertainty, nevertheless, crucially
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“Policy decisions under uncertainty must take into account a range of possible scenarios about
the state or structure of the economy, and those policy decisions may look quite different from
those that would be optimal under certainty.” Bernanke (2007)
1 Introduction
Does aggregate output uncertainty, i.e., mean-preserving variance changes to aggregate
output, matter for the level of optimal inflation rate? This question has probably never been
more important than it is now for monetary authorities. Unfortunately, the existing literature
has failed to provide a satisfactory answer to this question. For instance, the New-Keynesian
literature has indeed studied the effect of “model uncertainty”, i.e., uncertainty about the
parameters of the model, on the optimal inflation rate. However, because it heavily relies on
zero lower bound risks, one and potentially incomplete conclusion has been drawn, i.e., the
optimal inflation rate should increase in uncertainty to give more room for nominal interest
rate policy, e.g., Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Billi (2011), and Coibion, Gorodnichenko,
and Wieland (2012).1
Moreover, micro-founded monetary theories have remained silent on the aforementioned
question. While they, from Bewley’s (1983) model of money to more recent search-based
ones, e.g., see Lagos, Rocheteau, and Wright (2016) for an introduction, have focused on
idiosyncratic uncertainty for the essentiality of money, aggregate uncertainty effects on the
optimal inflation rate have been largely ignored. In other words, we still lack a monetary
theory to analyze if aggregate output uncertainty has any effect on the optimal inflation rate,
and if so, how such effects arise.2
The objective of this paper is therefore to propose a simple model of money that enables
us to answer this question. In order to avoid the tractability problem associated with the
aggregate uncertainty, I first adopt a two-period overlapping-generations (OLG) model of
money. Second, I bring insights from a recent macro-finance literature that exploits an
aggregate uncertainty based intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS) as in Bansal
and Yaron (2004), i.e., Epstein and Zin (1989) (EZ) preferences. Two key advantages of
EZ preferences are that agents’ aversion to cross-sectional and intertemporal risks become
separated, and the certainty equivalent of future consumption value directly affects today’s
1 See also Bernanke (2010) and Mishkin (2011) for skeptical views on this proposed relationship.
2 Difficulties associated with these questions within heterogeneous models of money lie in tracking equi-
libria with aggregate shocks. The literature has barely started solving for equilibria with idiosyncratic risks
analytically, e.g., see Menzio et al. (2013) and Rocheteau, Weil, and Wong (2015a). To incorporate aggre-
gate shocks, one would seem to need different numerical mechanisms such as Krusell and Smith (1998). See
Chiu and Molico (2014) who have recently developed a similar numerical technique for solving heterogeneous
models of money under aggregate shocks.
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utility. These features imply that agents’ optimal intertemporal decision rules are directly
affected by aggregate uncertainty, and can be derived in closed form.
The baseline model then considers a simple pure-currency endowment economy. The
young receive fixed units of endowments, while the old receive an uncertain endowment.
Fiat money becomes essential here because of its role as a sole savings instrument. Focusing
only on a unique monetary stationary equilibrium, the model delivers interesting monetary
policy implications. When agents’ aversion to intertemporal risks are relatively greater,
the Friedman rule becomes no longer optimal. The reason is that agents oversave in an
attempt to minimize intertemporal inequality of consumption, i.e., uncertainty creates the
so-called dynamic inefficiency in this OLG framework, e.g., Diamond (1965). Inflation up to
a certain point can correct this inefficiency by creating another form of dynamic inefficiency,
i.e., intergenerational transfers of endowments from the old to the young via lower rate of
return on money savings.
On the contrary, when agents dislike cross-sectional risks more, the opposite result arises.
Agents become more willing to transfer endowments towards today since they mind future
consumption variation more than the intertemporal one. This implies that uncertainty and
inflation generate dynamic inefficiency in the same direction so that the Friedman rule never
achieves the social efficiency unless uncertainty vanishes, but guarantees the second best
welfare outcome.
Despite these new insights, two obvious caveats exist in making a case against the Fried-
man rule using the baseline model. First, most of the EZ preferences based macro-finance
literature is on the premise that agents’ aversion to cross-sectional risks is larger (or agents
prefer early resolution of uncertainty) in order to be consistent with empirical patterns for
asset prices, e.g., see Backus, Routledge, and Zin (2004) and Henriksen, Kydland, and Sustek
(2013). Second, the OLG model of money misses fundamental trading frictions that give
rise to a medium of exchange (MOE) role of money. Thus, any policy recommendation from
the OLG model is at best incomplete.
To address these concerns, I extend the baseline model to include decentralized trading
mechanism in which money endogenously emerges as an MOE. To formalize this idea, the
extended model adopts the Lucas’s (1972) island framework augmented with decentralized
markets. In the generalized model, an additional consumption good, referred to as special
good, is introduced to generate the additional MOE role for money. In consequence, young
agents now face a problem of portfolio choice between money savings and money holdings
for spending on the special good.
The extended model then delivers a richer set of policy implications, and opens the
possibility of breaking the Friedman rule regardless of agents’ preferences for the timing of
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uncertainty resolution. When agents’ aversion to intertemporal risks is relatively higher,
agents over-accumulate money savings for the same reason in the baseline model. This, in
turn, endogenously affects the agent’s optimal portfolio to the extent that cash balances
for the purpose of buying the special good get inefficiently reduced. Accordingly, welfare
effects of inflation become non-trivial as opposed to the baseline model. A higher inflation
lowers the rate of return on money savings, and therefore can mitigate the intertemporal
misallocations caused by the over-money-savings. We call this a positive redistributive effect
of inflation. On the contrary, a higher inflation simultaneously worsens the inefficiency
caused by under-cash-spending for the special good. We call this as a negative price effect of
inflation. Eventually, the optimal inflation rate depends on which effect relatively dominates.
Numerical examples show that a positive inflation up to a certain threshold can indeed
make the positive redistributive effect dominant if such distortions, i.e., over-money-savings
and under-cash-spending, were initially severe enough. Otherwise, the price distortion effect
always dominates. Consequently, the Friedman rule achieves the second best. These results
are intuitive because the marginal (positive) redistributive effect of inflation is bigger when
the intertemporal allocation is already severely distorted. This mechanism draws an inter-
esting implication on the link between the aggregate output uncertainty and the optimal
inflation rate. Since a higher uncertainty worsens intertemporal misallocations in the first
place, the positive redistributive effect of inflation gets stronger. Thus, the optimal inflation
rate ought to increase in the aggregate output uncertainty in this case.
By the same token, the trade-off between the price and redistributive effect of inflation
works the opposite way when agents’ aversion to cross-sectional risks is higher. The reason
is as follows. The aggregate uncertainty induces agents to under-accumulate money savings
for the same reason in the baseline model. This implies that a higher inflation worsens in-
tertemporal misallocations, causing a negative redistributive effect of inflation this time. At
the same time, the portfolio effect ensures that over-cash-spending prevails in equilibrium,
thereby making the price effect of a higher inflation positive this time. In consequence, two
interesting implications can be drawn here. First, unlike the baseline model, the Friedman
rule can be suboptimal even under the agent’s preferences for the early resolution of uncer-
tainty when the positive price effect of inflation is strong enough. The second, and more
interesting result, is that a higher aggregate output uncertainty can lead to a lower optimal
inflation rate in this case. This is due to the fact that the marginal negative redistributive
effect of inflation gets stronger as higher uncertainty distorts intertemporal misallocations
more.
I do not intend to throughly review a vast literature of money studying optimal monetary
policy. Interested readers may refer to many excellent review papers such as Kocherlakota
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(2005) and Antinolfi, Azariadis, and Bullard (2016). I only provide a brief review of studies
that are related to the current paper in terms of the methodology and contribution.
To begin with, there are indeed existing OLG models of money making a case against
the Friedman rule, e.g., Schreft and Smith (1997); Schreft and Smith (2002); Smith (2002);
Bhattacharya, Haslag, and Martin (2005). Basically, they introduce financial intermediation
and limited communication to bring about heterogeneity and the suboptimality of the Fried-
man rule.3 Unlike them, the suboptimality in this paper emerges through an interaction
between aggregate output uncertainty and optimal intertemporal decisions by agents.
This paper also pertains to search-based models of money that emphasize redistributive
effects of inflation. Papers with analytically tractable models include but not limited to
Berensten, Camera, and Waller (2005); Menzio, Shi, and Sun (2013); Rocheteau et al.
(2015b); Rocheteau et al. (2015a), while the ones based on numerical methods are, for
example, Molico (1997); Kim and Lee (2008); Chiu and Molico (2010); Chiu and Molico
(2014). These papers generate stationary equilibria with non-degenerate distribution of
money holdings, thereby inducing inflation to enhance risk sharing, i.e., a case against the
Friedman rule.4 However, as already argued, they have yet to provide a framework for
the aggregate uncertainty based monetary policy analysis. In this aspect, the current model
contributes by proposing a very simple and tractable benchmark. Further, the current model
is novel because a portfolio decision of money holdings for a store of value and a medium of
exchange is considered.
There are different but similarly related empirical studies on the redistribution effects
of inflation. Doepke and Schneider (2006) show that inflation substantially affects nominal
wealth distribution through the role of money as a unit of account. On the contrary, the
current model emphasizes on other roles of money, i.e., as a store value and a medium of
exchange, for the wealth redistribution. Erosa and Ventura (2002) argue that inflation hurts
poor households more since they tend to over-hold cash relative to other forms of financial
assets. Unlike them, asymmetric inflation tax is levied upon different money holdings, i.e.,
either for savings and spending, rather than different households.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the physical en-
vironment in the baseline model. Section 3 studies efficient and competitive equilibrium
allocations in the baseline model. Section 4 introduces additional environments and analy-
ses the constrained efficient and competitive equilibrium allocations. Section 5 concludes.
3 Haslag and Martin (2003) show that this suboptimality hinges upon the existence of some instruments
that allow intergenerational transfers.
4 Recent studies, e.g., Lagos and Zhang (2015), Geromichalos and Herrenbrueck (2016), and Geromichalos
and Jung (2016), explore such redistributive effects within secondary over-the-counter asset markets using
money as MOE.
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2 The baseline model
We consider a simple version of OLG model advocated by Wallace (1980). Time is infinite
and discrete. In each period t a unit measure of agents are born who live only two periods,
i.e., t and t + 1. An agent born in period t has preferences of Epstein and Zin (1989) (EZ)
type, U(ct, ct+1), given by the following form.
U(ct, ct+1) =
[
c1−ρt + [Rt(ct+1)]
1−ρ] 11−ρ
where Rt(ct+1) =
(
Et
[
c1−γt+1
]) 1
1−γ , ρ > 0 .
Intuitively, EZ preferences are defined as a CES (Constant Elasticity of Substitution)
aggregate of current (known) consumption and a certainty equivalent Rt(ct+1) of tomorrow’s
consumption. Consequently, ρ and γ are interpreted as the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution and the risk aversion parameter respectively. A key feature of the
EZ preferences is that the two parameters, ρ and γ, can be separated while ρ is always pinned
by γ, i,e., ρ = γ, in a standard time-separable CRRA (Constant Relative Risk Aversion)
utility case. In other words, this distinctive feature of the EZ preferences allows agents to
differ in terms of an aversion to cross-sectional and intertemporal risks. When agents have
a relatively higher degree of aversion to cross-sectional (intertemporal) risks, i.e., γ > ρ
(γ < ρ), they are often regarded as ones who have preferences for early (late) resolution of
uncertainty in the literature.
The rest of environments follows a standard OLG model of money closely. Agents in their
first period of life will be called young while we use the term old for those who are in their
second period of life. We also assume that a unit measure of initial old agents, who live only
for one period, exists in the very first period 1. We call these agents as initial old. Further,
they are assumed to be collectively endowed with M0 units of perfectly divisible, intrinsically
useless, and government issued fiat money. Importantly, an endowment economy is assumed.
All young agents receive fixed units of the perishable consumption good, x. However, old
agents have idiosyncratic endowment risks. That is when agents become old, they receive
i.i.d. endowment shocks, ε units of the consumption good. For simplicity, we assume that ε
follows a uniform distribution, U(y − b, y + b) where y ≥ b and x ≥ (y + b).
Time discounting and population growth are ruled out for simplicity. The government’s
policy is implemented through lump-sum money transfers to old agents in each period. We
denote τt as the lump-sum transfer that each old agents receives in period t, in terms of the
period t consumption good. We also let Mt denote the total money supply in period t. No
other forms of tax or transfers are assumed to be feasible. That is the lump-sum money
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transfers are the only available instrument for the government policy in this economy. Given
this restriction, the government budget constraint implies ϕt(Mt −Mt−1) = τt, ∀t where ϕt
denotes the real price of money in period t. Finally, the government is assumed to increase
or decrease money supply at a constant rate each period, i,e., Mt = µMt−1, ∀t with µ ≥ 1.5
In sum, the government budget constraint and the monetary policy rule implies the following
condition every period.
ϕtMt (1− 1/µ) = τt ∀t. (1)
3 Efficiency and competitive equilibrium
We first study a social planner problem in this economy. In doing so, we only focus on
stationary allocations, i.e., the planner is constrained in such a way that he/she can only
choose stationary allocations in this economy. Let (c∗y, c
∗
o) denote the stationary allocations
that the social planner chooses to maximize the welfare of agents born in generations ∀ t.
Then, it must be a solution to the following problem.
max
c∗y ,c∗o
[
(c∗y)
1−ρ + ([c∗o]
1−γ)
1−ρ
1−γ
] 1
1−ρ
(2)
s.t c∗y + c
∗
o = x+ y,
where the aggregate (resource) constraint indicates that total consumption of young agents
plus total consumption of old agents can not exceed the total endowment in each period.
Note that the expectation operator inside the EZ preferences is eliminated due to no uncer-
tainty on c∗o. The following lemma summarizes the socially optimal stationary allocations of
consumptions by young and old agents.
Lemma 1 The socially efficient stationary allocations satisfy the following condition.
c∗y = c
∗
o =
x+ y
2
.
Proof. The proof follows easily from the first order condition to the problem (2), and it is,
therefore, omitted.
The efficient stationary allocations are characterized by equal division of endowments
between young and old agents. This follows directly from that fact that the objective function
5 The Friedman rule corresponds, therefore, to µ = 1, i.e., zero inflation, in this economy.
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(indifference curve) is convex to the origin and the absolute slope of resource constraint equals
to one.
Next, we study the properties of a competitive equilibrium in this economy. First, an
agent born in period t faces the following problem.
max
ct,ct+1
[
(ct)
1−ρ + Et
[
(ct+1)
1−γ] 1−ρ1−γ ] 11−ρ (3)
s.t ct + ϕtmt = x,
and ct+1 = ϕt+1mt + τt+1 + εt+1.
where mt denotes the nominal quantity of money held by an agent born in period t, and εt+1
denotes the stochastic endowment that the old receive. Intuitively, agents face uncertainty
with regard to endowments when they become old. Thus, fiat money serves as a savings
instrument for young agents. This admits intuitive explanation for the two constraints in
problem (3). The first one refers to a budget constraint for young agents in their first period
of life, and the second one simply says that consumption when old must be financed by
money savings from previous period, lump-sum money transfers by the government, and
idiosyncratic endowment shocks.
To simplify the above problem, substitute for the two constraints in the objective function.
This leads one to obtain
max
mt
U(x− ϕtmt, ϕt+1mt + τt+1 + εt+1).
Assuming an interior solution, the first-order condition is given by
ϕt
ϕt+1
=
U2(x− ϕtmt, ϕt+1mt + τt+1 + εt+1)
U1(x− ϕtmt, ϕt+1mt + τt+1 + εt+1) ≡ Qt,t+1,
where Uj(ct, ct+1), ∀j ∈ {1, 2} denotes the first partial derivative of the EZ utility function
with respect to the jth argument, and Qt,t+1 denotes the intertemporal marginal rate of
substitution (IMRS). Using the characteristics of the EZ preferences the following lemma
summarizes individual optimal choice by young agents.
Lemma 2 Let ϕt+1mt + τt+1 ≡ h(mt). Given aggregate real money prices {ϕt, ϕt+1} and
individual endowment shocks εt+1, the young agents’ individual optimal choice of mt must
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satisfy the following condition. ϕt/ϕt+1 = Qt,t+1(mt, εt+1)∀t where
Qt,t+1(mt, εt+1) =
[
h(mt) + εt+1
x− ϕtmt
]−ρ[
h(mt) + εt+1
Et [(h(mt) + εt+1)1−γ]
1
1−γ
]ρ−γ
,
and Et
[
(h(mt) + εt+1)
1−γ] = (h(mt) + y + b)(2−γ) − (h(mt) + y − b)(2−γ)
2b(2− γ) .
Proof. See the appendix.
A key point to note here is that uncertainty regarding future endowments directly affects
IMRS under ρ 6= γ as can be verified in Lemma 2. Intuitively, the EZ preferences depend on
the certainty equivalent of tomorrow’s consumption value instead of the expected value of
tomorrow’s consumption. This implies that whenever the variance of tomorrow’s consump-
tion changes, the certainty equivalent of tomorrow’s consumption value changes accordingly
which in turn affects the relative value of future consumption, i,e., IMRS. This particular
mechanism has far reaching implications on the welfare of this economy in equilibrium, to be
discussed in much detail later. Lastly, note that this mechanism disappears as long as ρ = γ,
i.e., under the standard time-separable CRRA utility case. In other words, uncertainty with
regard to aggregate output does not affect consumption allocations under a standard OLG
model of money with a conventional utility functional form.
Now, we describe competitive equilibrium, with a special focus on the effects of mone-
tary policy on welfare. First, we restrict attention to symmetric, monetary, and stationary
equilibrium where ϕt > 0,∀t, all young agents in each period choose the same real money
balances, and the real variables of the model remain constant over time. Then, the definition
of symmetric, monetary, and stationary equilibrium is given by
Definition 1 A competitive, symmetric, monetary, and stationary equilibrium is a list
{Z, cy, co}, where Z = Zt = ϕtMt, ∀t and {cy, co} = {x − Z,Z + y}. The equilibrium
real money balance Z satisfies Lemma 2 given that ϕt/ϕt+1 = µ, εt+1 = E [ε] = y, and
ϕtmt = ϕt+1mt+1 + τt+1 = Z.
This definition gives rise to the following log-linearized equation that Z must satisfies,
i.e., G(Z, µ, x, y, b) = 0, where
G(Z, µ, x, y, b) ≡ ln (µ) + ρ {ln (Z + y)− ln (x− Z)} − (ρ− γ) ln (Z + y) (4)
− γ − ρ
1− γ
{
ln
[
(Z + y + b)2−γ
(2− γ) −
(Z + y − b)2−γ
(2− γ)
]
− ln (2b)
}
.
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Equation (4) allows us to conduct various comparative static analyses on stationary
welfare of the economy. In order to emphasize the effects of uncertainty regarding endowment
shocks, i.e., the variance of ε, we categorize the equilibrium into three different cases: 1. ρ =
γ, i.e., indifferent preferences for the resolution of uncertainty, 2. ρ > γ, i,e., preferences for
late resolution of uncertainty, and 3. ρ < γ, i.e., preferences for early resolution of uncertainty.
The first case where ρ = γ, i.e., the utility functional form is time-separable CRRA,
is straightforward. As in a standard OLG model of money, uncertainty, i.e., changes in
b, has no effects on the stationary allocation, and the Friedman Rule, achieves the social
efficiency. These can be easily understood by setting ρ = γ in eq.(4). Intuition is that ρ = γ
leads to complete equalization of expected future consumption and its certainty equivalent
value, which in turn implies no uncertainty effects on the IMRS. In addition, as soon as µ
exceeds one, i.e., positive inflation prevails in stationary equilibrium, the rate of return on
money savings decreases. Therefore, young agents save less and inefficiently consume too
much compared to the social optimum. In other words, money creation causes dynamic
inefficiency to the extent that intergenerational transfers of resources from the old to the
young harm the social welfare.
When agents’ level of aversion to cross-sectional and intertemporal risks differ, things
get a lot more interesting. First, the following proposition summarizes comparative static
analyses under the case where agents prefer late resolution of uncertainty, i.e., ρ > γ.
Proposition 1 Consider the second case where ρ > γ. Let ZEZ denote real money balances
in stationary equilibrium. Likewise, let ZSP denote the social planner’s (implied) resource
transfers from the young to the old, i.e., ZSP ≡ (x − y)/2. A unique stationary monetary
equilibrium exists, i.e., ∃! ZEZ, only if lnµ < µ¯, where
µ¯ =
γ − ρ
1− γ
{
ln
[
(y + b)2−γ − (y − b)2−γ
2b(2− γ)
]}
− γ ln y + ρ lnx.
The followings then hold true in the unique stationary monetary equilibrium: ZEZ > ZSP ,
∂ZEZ/∂µ < 0, and ∂ZEZ/∂b > 0. Lastly, there exists a unique money growth rate µ
∗ greater
than one that achieves the social optimum, and µ∗ has the following closed form solution.
µ∗ =
[
x− y
2
]ρ−γ [(x+b
2
)2−γ − (x−b
2
)2−γ
2b(2− γ)
] γ−ρ
1−γ
> 1,
where ∂µ∗/∂b > 0, ∂µ∗/∂y < 0, and ∂µ∗/∂(x− y) > 0.
Proof. See the appendix.
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Proposition 1 can be intuitively understood through the lens of agents’ uncertainty aver-
sion. Under the EZ preferences with ρ > γ agents’ aversion to intertemporal risks is greater
than that to cross-sectional risks. Loosely speaking, agents dislike intertemporal inequality
more than cross-sectional inequality among old agents. This in turn means that agents are
willing to transfer resources from the young to the old a lot more aggressively compared to
the social optimum, i.e., ZEZ > ZSP .
By the same token, the fact that higher uncertainty regarding future endowment shocks
leads agents to save more, i.e., ∂ZEZ/∂b > 0, can be easily explained. Under the EZ
preferences, agents’ utility comes from current consumption and the certainty equivalent
of future consumption. Since higher uncertainty, i.e., a higher b, reduces the certainty
equivalent value, other things being equal, the higher uncertainty would effectively lead
to more intertemporal inequality. Thus, under preferences for late resolution of uncertainty,
i.e., ρ > γ, agents would transfer more consumption to the old in response to a higher level
of uncertainty regarding future endowment shocks.
However, the effect of inflation on money savings would be completely opposite. The idea
is straightforward as in the first case. A higher money growth rate depresses the rate of return
on money savings, and therefore lowers equilibrium real money balances, i.e., ∂ZEZ/∂µ < 0.
In sum, uncertainty, i.e., b > 0, and inflation, i.e., µ > 1, both generate dynamic inefficiency
but in opposite direction. The former tends to generate over-money-savings while the latter
does generate under-money-savings.
This at the end of the day rationalizes why optimal inflation could be a positive level
in this framework. Dynamic inefficiency caused by uncertainty can be corrected by money
creation which also generates dynamic inefficiency but exactly in opposite direction. This
intuition can be applied to understand ∂µ∗/∂b > 0. Higher uncertainty leads to over-money-
savings to a greater extent. In order to offset this force, an opposite force generating more
under-money-savings, i,e., higher inflation, is needed. Furthermore, the optimal inflation
rate falls as the mean of future endowment shocks increases, i.e., ∂µ∗/∂y < 0. This result is
again intuitive. A higher y means less intertemporal inequality. Thus, under ρ > γ agents’
desire to save also gets weaker. Since ZEZ gets smaller and closer to ZSP , optimal inflation
rate should fall as well.
Next, we move on to the third case, ρ < γ. When agents prefer early resolution of
uncertainty, the economy behaves in somewhat opposite way to the second case. Proposition
2 summarizes comparative static analyses under the case where agents prefer early resolution
of uncertainty, i.e., ρ < γ.
Proposition 2 Consider the third case where ρ < γ. A unique stationary monetary equi-
librium exists, i.e., ∃! ZEZ only if lnµ < µ¯. When lnµ ≥ µ¯, stationary equilibrium is
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either non-monetary or monetary, but exhibits multiplicity. Focusing on the unique station-
ary monetary equilibrium, the followings then hold true: ZEZ < ZSP , ∂ZEZ/∂µ < 0, and
∂ZEZ/∂b < 0. Lastly, the Friedman rule, i.e., µ = 1, does not achieve the social optimum,
but does guarantee the second-best.
Proof. See the appendix.
In order to understand the Proposition 2 one needs to recall intuition from Proposition
1. First, ρ < γ effectively means that agents value uncertain future consumption a lot less
than certain current consumption, i.e., they dislike cross-sectional variation in consumption
among the old more than intertemporal variation in consumption. Thus, agents are less
willing to transfer resources from the young to the old compared to the social optimum, i.e.,
ZEZ < ZSP .
The effect of uncertainty on real money balances is also opposite to the second case.
Under ρ < γ, higher uncertainty, i.e., a higher b, makes agents value future consumption
less than the current one because they relatively dislike cross-sectional variation in future
consumption more. Thus, agents would reduce real money balances, i.e., less savings, in
response to a higher uncertainty, i.e., ∂ZEZ/∂b < 0.
A higher inflation would still reduce real money balances as in the second case, i.e.,
∂ZEZ/∂µ < 0. This is because changes in the rate of return on money savings does not affect
agents’ aversion to either cross-sectional or intertemporal risks. To sum up, a higher inflation
and a higher level of uncertainty both leads to under-money-savings when agents prefer early
resolution of uncertainty. In other words, money creation and uncertainty generates dynamic
inefficiency in the same direction. This inevitably implies that even Friedman rule does
not achieve the social efficiency under uncertainty, but guarantees the second best welfare
outcome.
Figure 1 illustrates numerical examples on how the welfare of this economy responds to
changes in inflation rate at stationary equilibrium. The steady-state welfare is defined as
the sum of all agents’ net utilities in the unique stationary monetary equilibrium. The left
panel corresponds to the second case, i.e., ρ > γ, while the right panel shows the result in
the third case, i.e., ρ < γ.
Lessons from this simple model is clear. Welfare effects of inflation critically hinges upon
how agents perceive uncertainty risks. Monetary authority can achieve the first-best through
money creation only if people prefer late resolution of uncertainty. Otherwise, the first-best
is not feasible, but to achieve the second-best they should pursue a Laissez-Faire policy, i.e.,
zero money growth. A final point is that most macro-finance literature heavily based upon
the EZ preferences assumes ρ < γ because the latter generates asset pricing implications
12
consistent with empirical observations (see Bansal and Yaron (2004) and related literature).
However, this does not necessarily have to mean that the Friedman rule is always the best
policy to pursue even after taking account of uncertainty effects, which is a topic of the next
section.
Figure 1: Numerical examples for welfare analysis in the baseline model
4 The extended model
Critiques against the OLG model of money often point that it is not explicit about
monetary exchange, potentially the most important source of the essentiality of money. To
put it differently, money does not serve a medium of exchange (MOE) role in the OLG model.
To remedy this deficiency search models with microfoundations of monetary exchange have
emerged and recently become the workhorse paradigm for monetary theory (see Lagos et al.
(2016) for a survey of recent search based monetary theories). For this reason we modify
model environments to incorporate additional role of money as MOE, and study if this
modification alters any welfare implications of inflation.
To begin with, we adopt a modified version of the Lucas’s (1972) island model. The
economy consists of one main island at the center and a unit measure of periphery islands.
An agent called seller is born in each periphery island each period, and live for only one
period. We assume that each seller is endowed with a technology to produce special goods
with linear disutility of labor. These special goods are perishable with a one-period life and
are not portable across islands. In addition, sellers can move around islands without any
physical frictions, and get the linear utility from consuming general goods, endowed only to
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agents called household who lives at the main island.
Household in this economy, to some extent, resembles the agent in the previous model.
Each period, a unit measure of household is born in the main island, and lives only for two
periods. Each young household is endowed with fixed units of perishable and not-portable-
across-islands general good, x. Yet, old households receive random units of general good,
ε following a uniform distribution, U(y − b, y + b) where y ≥ b and x ≥ (y + b). Unlike
the previous economy, this household consists of two individuals called worker and shopper.
Workers are not allowed to leave the main island, and get the utility only from general
goods consumed. Shoppers are free to move around islands, and young shoppers never
get the consumption utility. Yet, old shoppers get the utility only from consuming special
goods, which they need to acquire from sellers living in periphery islands. Lastly, the rest
of environments are identical to the previous model. Monetary policy is implemented in the
same manner as the previous model, i.e., lump-sum money transfers to old households in the
main island with a constant growth rate, µ ≥ 1. Time discounting and population growth
are ruled out.
Altogether, these features of the economy creates the motivation for bilateral trading
between shoppers and sellers every period. Following standard search based monetary the-
ories, we assume limited commitment and anonymity within bilateral meetings. This rules
out any kind of credit arrangement between shoppers and sellers. That is in each period
only old shoppers leave the main island and search for sellers living in periphery islands.
For simplicity we assume a perfect matching, i.e., every periphery island receives only one
old shopper each period. Barter is not feasible in this framework since general goods are
not portable across islands. This consequently gives rise to money serving an additional
MOE role in this economy. To avoid complexity we adopt take-it-or-leave-it offer by (old)
shoppers to sellers as pricing protocol within a pair-wise trade. Assuming old shoppers can
never come back to the main island once they leave, bargaining solutions are trivial. Old
shopper always gives up all of her real balances brought up to the meeting, and young seller
produces exactly the same amount of special goods as the real money balances he or she
receives.
Lastly, a household born in period t has preferences of Epstein and Zin (1989) (EZ) type,
U(ct, st+1, ct+1), given by the following form.
U(ct, st+1, ct+1) =
[
c1−ρt + s
1−ρ
t+1 + [Rt(ct+1)]
1−ρ] 11−ρ
where Rt(ct+1) =
(
Et
[
c1−γt+1
]) 1
1−γ , ρ > 0.
ct and ct+1 denote the amount of general goods consumed by the worker in period t and
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t + 1, while st+1 denotes the amount of special goods consumed by the shopper in period
t+ 1. Figure 2 illustrates the timing of key events.
Figure 2: Timing of Events
Period t Period t + 1
• Young households are born in the main island,
and choose a portfolio of money savings and
cash holdings for purchasing special goods.
• A seller is born in each periphery island,
and trade with an old shopper using cash.
• After the bargaining is done, the seller moves
to the main island and consumes general goods
and then die.
• Old workers consume general goods
using money savings, and then die.
• Old shoppers visit sellers and trade using cash
as MOE. They consume special goods and die.
• Sellers repeat the same action as in period t.
4.1 Efficiency and competitive equilibrium
As in the previous model, we only focus on stationary allocations. Let (c∗y, s
∗, c∗o, n
∗)
denote the stationary allocations (general goods consumed by young workers, special goods
consumed by old shoppers, general goods consumed by old workers, and general goods con-
sumed by sellers respectively) that the social planner chooses to maximize the welfare of
agents born in generations ∀t. Yet, unlike the previous model, we call the social planner’s
solution as the constrained efficient stationary allocation because we assume that the planner
here is subject to restrictions of the physical environment, such as the trading protocol in
each periphery island. Then, the planner’s solution solves for the following problem.
max
c∗y ,c∗o
{[
(c∗y)
1−ρ + (s∗)1−ρ + ([c∗o]
1−γ)
1−ρ
1−γ
] 1
1−ρ
+ [n∗ − s∗]
}
(5)
s.t c∗y + c
∗
o + n
∗ = x+ y
and s∗ = n∗,
where the first aggregate (resource) constraint implies that total general goods consumed by
households and sellers must be same as total endowments of the general good in each period.
The second aggregate (resource) constraint simply tells that total special goods consumed
by (old) shoppers equal to total special goods produced by sellers each period. Note that
the latter equals to the former due to the take-it-or-leave-it offer, which also explains the
second linear part in the objective function. The following lemma summarizes the socially
optimal stationary allocations of consumptions by households and sellers.
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Lemma 3 The constrained efficient stationary allocations satisfy the following condition.
c∗y = s
∗ = c∗o = n
∗ =
x+ y
3
.
Proof. The proof follows easily from the first order condition to the problem (5), and it is,
therefore, omitted.
Intuition behind this constrained efficient stationary allocation follows from the previous
model in a similar way.
We proceed to competitive equilibrium analysis. Unlike the previous model, a young
household needs to acquire money balances not only for smooth general good consumption
but also for purchasing special goods when old. This gives rise to a portfolio choice problem
for the young household, i.e., mct (money savings for general good consumption) and m
s
t
(cash holdings for purchasing special goods).6 Then, the problem faced by a household born
in period t is given by
max
mct ,m
s
t
U(x− ϕtmct − ϕtmst , ϕt+1mst + τ st+1, ϕt+1mct + τ ct+1 + εt+1),
where the first, second, and third input refers to ct, st+1, and ct+1 respectively. Note that
τ kt+1 = (m
k
t /mt)τt+1, k ∈ {c, s} where mt denotes total money balances held by the young
household. τt+1 denotes the lump-sum transfer that the young household is expected to
receive in period t+ 1, and satisfies eq.(1).
Assuming an interior solution, the FOC comprises of a system of two equations given by
ϕt
ϕt+1
=
U3(x− ϕtmct − ϕtmst , ϕt+1mst + τ st+1, ϕt+1mct + τ ct+1 + εt+1)
U1(x− ϕtmct − ϕtmst , ϕt+1mst + τ st+1, ϕt+1mct + τ ct+1 + εt+1)
≡ Qt,t+1, (6)
1 =
U3(x− ϕtmct − ϕtmst , ϕt+1mst + τ st+1, ϕt+1mct + τ ct+1 + εt+1)
U2(x− ϕtmct − ϕtmst , ϕt+1mst + τ st+1, ϕt+1mct + τ ct+1 + εt+1)
, (7)
where Uj(ct, st+1, ct+1),∀j ∈ {1, 2, 3} denotes the first partial derivative of the EZ utility
function with respect to the jth argument, and Qt,t+1 in eq.(6) denotes the intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution (IMRS) for general goods. Equation (7) implies the intra-
temporal optimality between st+1 and ct+1. Using the characteristics of the EZ preferences
the following lemma summarizes individual optimal choice by the young household.
Lemma 4 Let ϕt+1m
c
t + τ
c
t+1 ≡ h(mct) and ϕt+1mst + τ st+1 ≡ h(mst). Given aggregate real
money prices {ϕt, ϕt+1} and individual endowment shocks εt+1, the young household’s optimal
6 We assume the endowment shocks are realized after shoppers leave the main island in order for a
household to choose a portfolio ex-ante.
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portfolio choice of {mct ,mst} must satisfy the following conditions
1.
ϕt
ϕt+1
= Qt,t+1(m
c
t ,m
s
t , εt+1) ∀t,
2. h(mst) = [x− ϕtmct − ϕtmst ]γ/ρ
[
Et
[
(h(mct) + εt+1)
1−γ] 11−γ ](ρ−γ)/ρ ∀t,
where Qt,t+1(m
c
t ,m
s
t , εt+1) =
[
h(mct) + εt+1
x− ϕtmct − ϕtmst
]−ρ[
h(mct) + εt+1
Et [(h(mct) + εt+1)
1−γ]
1
1−γ
]ρ−γ
,
and Et
[
(h(mct) + εt+1)
1−γ] = (h(mct) + y + b)(2−γ) − (h(mct) + y − b)(2−γ)
2b(2− γ) .
Proof. Proof for the intertemporal optimality follows easily from Proof for Lemma 2. The
intra-temporal optimality can be easily derived from the fact that U2 = U
ρ
s−ρt+1.
Interpretation of Lemma 4 follows similarly from Lemma 2 except for the second intra-
temporal optimality. Now we directly proceed to competitive equilibrium. As before, we
restrict attention to the symmetric monetary, and stationary equilibrium, which is defined
as follows.
Definition 2 A competitive, symmetric, monetary, and stationary equilibrium is a list
{Zc, Zs, n, s, cy, co}, where Zct ≡ ϕtmct = h(mct) = Zc ∀t, Zst ≡ ϕtmst = h(mst) = Zs ∀t,
Zs + Zc = ϕtMt ∀t, and {cy, co, s, n} = {x − Zs − Zc, Zc + y, Zs, Zs}. The equilibrium real
money balances {Zc, Zs} satisfy Lemma 4 given that ϕt/ϕt+1 = µ and εt+1 = E [ε] = y.
Following this definition, a system of two log-linearized equations that {Zc, Zs} must
satisfy emerges.
ln (µ)− ρ ln (x− Zc − Zs) + γ ln (Zc + y) = (γ − ρ) ln (R(Zc + y)) (8)
ln (Zs) = (γ/ρ) ln (Zc + y) + {(ρ− γ)/ρ} ln (R(Zc + y)), (9)
where ln (R(Zc + y)) =
1
1− γ
{
ln
[
(Zc + y + b)2−γ
2b(2− γ) −
(Zc + y − b)2−γ
2b(2− γ)
]}
.
As in the previous model, we conduct comparative static analyses based on the three
cases regarding agents’ preferences for uncertainty resolution. The first case where ρ = γ
admits the same welfare implication of inflation as before. When agents are indifferent to the
timing of uncertainty resolution, the Friedman rule achieves the constrained efficiency. This
can be easily verified by setting ρ = γ in eq.(8) and (9). The idea is that a higher inflation
lowers the rate of return on real money balances used both as a savings instrument and a
MOE for purchasing the special good. Thus, money creation generates dynamic inefficiency
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in a sense that households save less and under-consume special goods compared to the social
optimum.
Next, we consider the second case ρ > γ, which brings about a much richer set of
comparative static analyses on stationary allocations. The next proposition summarizes
such results.
Proposition 3 Consider the second case where ρ > γ. Let ZcEZ and Z
s
EZ denote real money
balances held for savings and purchasing special goods respectively in stationary equilibrium.
Likewise, let cy,EZ denote general goos consumed by young workers in stationary equilibrium.
A unique stationary monetary equilibrium exists, i.e., ∃! ZcEZ and ∃! ZsEZ, only if lnµ < p¯i,
p¯i =
γ − ρ
1− γ
{
ln
[
(y + b)2−γ − (y − b)2−γ
2b(2− γ)
]}
− γ ln y + ρ ln (x− f(0)), and
f(0) = exp
{
γ
ρ
ln (y) +
ρ− γ
ρ(1− γ)
{
ln
[
(y + b)2−γ − (y − b)2−γ
2b(2− γ)
]}}
.
The followings then hold true in the unique stationary monetary equilibrium: ∂ZcEZ/∂b > 0,
∂ZsEZ/∂b < 0, ∂Z
s
EZ/µ < 0, ∂Z
c
EZ/µ < 0, ∂cy,EZ/∂b < 0, and ∂cy,EZ/∂µ > 0. Lastly, the
Friedman rule does not achieve the constrained efficiency due to uncertain endowments to
old workers. Furthermore, even the second-best is not generally guaranteed by the Friedman
rule. That is the optimal inflation rate that achieves the second-best critically depends upon
structural parameters of the economy such as x, y, and b.
Proof. See the appendix.
Focusing on the unique stationary monetary equilibrium, uncertainty effects are similar
to the previous model. Since households dislike intertemporal inequality in terms of general
good consumption to a greater extent, they accumulate more money savings in response to a
higher b, i.e., ∂ZcEZ/∂b > 0. This in turn means that young workers under-consume general
goods in equilibrium. Given that households equalize the marginal utility from consuming
general goods when young and special goods when old, cash holdings for special goods must
fall as well when b goes up, i.e., ∂ZsEZ/∂b < 0.
As before, inflation leads to lower real money balances used for both savings and pur-
chasing special goods due to a lower rate of return on money holdings, i.e., ∂ZsEZ/µ < 0
and ∂ZcEZ/µ < 0. What is distinct from the previous model is that money creation and
uncertainty create dynamic inefficiency in opposite direction only in terms of general goods
consumed in equilibrium, i.e., ∂ZcEZ/∂b > 0 and ∂Z
c
EZ/µ < 0. On the contrary, inflation
and uncertainty change the equilibrium special good consumption in the same direction,
∂ZsEZ/∂b < 0 and ∂Z
c
EZ/µ < 0. This implies that money creation can never correct the
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dynamic inefficiency caused by a lower ZsEZ with a positive b. This intuitively explains why
the Friedman rule can never achieve the constrained efficiency whenever uncertainty prevails
in this economy.
What’s more interesting is that the optimal (second-best) inflation rate in this case is
usually not the Friedman rule. This follows from two offsetting welfare effects of inflation.
This economy faces a fundamental trade-off between a negative price effect and a positive
redistributive effect of inflation. The former refers to the ability of inflation affecting self-
insurance through changes in the rate of return on currency, while the latter revolves around
the ability of inflation providing risk sharing among agents through intergenerational trans-
fers of money. For instance, the price effect of inflation on welfare is always negative since a
higher inflation always leads to lower rates of return on both money savings and cash hold-
ings for purchasing special goods. Therefore, other things being equal, the Friedman rule is
the best policy to pursue. However, inflation also has a redistributive effect. This welfare
effect could be positive as long as the level of µ is under a certain threshold level. This can
be intuitively understood by the fact that cy,EZ < cy and co,EZ > co in equilibrium, and a
higher inflation can move both cy,EZ and co,EZ closer to the constrained efficient allocation
up to a certain level, i.e., µ ↑⇒ cy,EZ ↑ and co,EZ ↓. In sum, when the distribution effect
dominates the price effect, the social welfare could increase up to a certain inflation rate,
µop. Otherwise, zero inflation guarantees the second best.
Figure 3: Numerical examples for welfare analysis in the extended model with ρ > γ
Conditions under which the distribution effect dominates generally depend upon param-
eters of the economy. Figure 3 illustrates a couple of numerical examples. The left panel
shows the case where the ratio between x and y is relatively small and the level of uncertainty
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b is relatively high, while the right panel shows the opposite case. As seen, the former case
implies a positive optimal inflation rate, on the other hand, the Friedman rule is optimal in
the latter. Intuition behind this goes as follows. The distribution effect generally dominates
the price effect whenever co,EZ − cy,EZ is larger because the marginal effect of a higher in-
flation on reducing co,EZ − cy,EZ gets bigger. Loosely speaking, when the intergenerational
distribution of {cy,EZ , co,EZ} was so distorted to begin with, the positive redistributive effect
of inflation becomes much more powerful. Thus, the distribution effect can dominate the
price effect when inflation is relatively low. Since a lower (x/y) and a higher b both mean
a more distorted intergenerational distribution of the general good consumption, a higher
inflation can enhance social welfare up to a threshold point. Furthermore, it turns out that
this threshold point, i.e., µop is increasing in the level of uncertainty once the µop is positive.
This is again because a higher b leads to a more distorted distribution of {cy,EZ , co,EZ},
strengthening the positive redistributive effect of inflation.
Using the intuition so far, it follows easily that the third case, ρ < γ, brings about
opposite comparative static analyses on stationary allocations in general. First, Proposition
4 summarizes such results.
Proposition 4 Consider the third case where ρ < γ. A unique stationary monetary equi-
librium exists, i.e., ∃! ZcEZ and ∃! ZsEZ, only if lnµ < p¯i. The followings then hold true in
the unique stationary monetary equilibrium: ∂ZcEZ/∂b < 0, ∂Z
s
EZ/∂b > 0, ∂Z
s
EZ/µ < 0,
∂ZcEZ/µ < 0, ∂cy,EZ/∂b > 0, and ∂cy,EZ/∂µ > 0. Lastly, the Friedman rule does not achieve
the constrained efficiency due to uncertainty-induced dynamic inefficiency. Furthermore,
even the second-best is not generally guaranteed by the Friedman rule. That is the optimal
inflation rate that achieves the second-best critically depends upon structural parameters of
the economy such as x, y, and b.
Proof. See the appendix.
Uncertainty effects on the stationary allocation are exactly opposite to the second case.
Since households don’t mind intertemporal inequality in terms of general good consumption
much, but are very averse to cross-section variation in the general good consumption when
old, they accumulate less money savings in response to a higher b, i.e., ∂ZcEZ/∂b < 0. This
in turn means that young workers over-consume general goods in equilibrium. Given that
households equalize the marginal utility from consuming general goods when young and
special goods when old, cash holdings for special goods must increase as well when b goes
up, i.e., ∂ZsEZ/∂b > 0.
Inflation effects on the stationary allocation are same as before, i.e., ∂ZsEZ/µ < 0 and
∂ZcEZ/µ < 0, for obvious reasons. Interestingly, money creation here cannot restore the
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constrained efficiency due to a different reason than the one in the second case economy.
That is a higher b in this case causes dynamic inefficiency through lowering ZcEZ below the
socially efficient level. However, a higher µ also lowers ZcEZ . In sum, the third case economy
suffers from under-savings, but a higher inflation can only make things worse at least in
this respect, i.e., a negative redistributive effect of inflation prevails. Thus, the constrained
efficiency can never be achieved here.
What is crucial is that a positive level of inflation can achieve the second best under
certain parameter values of the economy. This is in sharp contrast to the baseline model
where the Friedman rule always leads to the second-best welfare outcome whenever ρ < γ.
The outcome stems from the addition of special goods in the extended model. Recall that
in the baseline model, the welfare effect of inflation was always negative because money
creation and uncertainty generate dynamic inefficiency in the same direction. However, this
is not the case here because at least a higher inflation can correct over-consumptions of the
special good to some extent, i.e., ∂ZsEZ/∂b > 0 and ∂Z
s
EZ/µ < 0. In sum, there’s a room for
the price effect of inflation on welfare could be positive. This in turn means that the social
welfare could increase up to a certain level of inflation rate when the positive price effect
dominates the aforementioned negative redistributive effect.
Figure 4: Numerical examples for welfare analysis in the extended model with ρ < γ
Figure 4 illustrate such examples in a numerical exercise. As opposed to Figure 3, the
left panel shows the case where the ratio between x and y is relatively high and the level
of uncertainty b is relatively low, while the right panel shows the opposite case. As can be
witnessed, the former case implies a positive optimal inflation rate, on the other hand, the
Friedman rule is optimal in the latter. Intuition behind this is exactly opposite to that in the
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second case. The positive price effect generally dominates the negative redistributive effect
when cy,EZ − co,EZ is larger and/or b is lower because the marginal (negative) redistributive
effect of a higher inflation on raising cy,EZ − co,EZ gets smaller. Loosely speaking, when
the intergenerational distribution of {cy,EZ , co,EZ} was relatively less distorted in the first
place through a higher ratio between x and y and/or too much spending on special goods
prevails in the first place, the positive price effect of inflation dominates. Thus, a higher
inflation can enhance social welfare up to a threshold point. Lastly, a lower b implies a
less distorted intergenerational distribution of the general good consumption, weakening the
negative redistributive effect of inflation. Thus, the optimal inflation rate ought to decrease
in aggregate output uncertainty once the former is positive. To sum up, the relationship
between the optimal inflation rate and aggregate output uncertainty generally turns out to
become positive (negative) when agents prefer late (early) resolution of uncertainty.
5 Conclusion
By exploiting a pure currency OLG model of money with the EZ preferences, this paper
delivers a new set of monetary policy implications, especially in terms of a link between
aggregate output uncertainty and the optimal inflation rate. I show that agents’ preferences
for the timing of uncertainty resolution and the initial condition for intertemporal misallo-
cations crucially determine such relationship. I do admit limitations of this model for policy
recommendations because economies considered here are extreme, e.g., too low transactional
frequency and the infeasibility of any sort of taxation. Yet, I do believe that lessons from
this study remain valid as a good benchmark for further studies, and it should be relatively
easy to integrate real and more complex features of monetary economies into the model.
For example, following Kocherlakota (2005) and Wallace (2014), one could extend this
model to include alternative instruments for intergenerational transfers, and study if such
modifications alter the nature of the optimal monetary policy under aggregate uncertainty.
Also, one could add other forms of institutions that mitigate various trading frictions such
as financial assets and over-the-counter markets. This could allow us to study how liquidity
properties of such additional institutions as well as the optimal monetary policy interact with
aggregate uncertainty, and potentially to help us understand many asset pricing anomalies.7
Lastly, although not emphasized here, one could study dynamics and/or multiplicity in this
framework. This dimension of research could potentially enrich types of multiple equilibria
that the OLG model usually exhibits, e.g., Boldrin and Woodford (1990).
7 Lagos (2010), Geromichalos, Herrenbrueck, and Salyer (2013), and Geromichalos, Lee, Lee, and Oikawa
(2015) are in similar spirits in this sense.
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Appendix
Proof for Lemma 2
Since U(ct, ct+1) is homogeneous of degree 1, Euler’s theorem holds. Then using eq.(2),
U =
∂U
∂ct
+ Et
[
∂U
∂ct+1
ct+1
]
where
∂U
∂ct
=
1
1− ρU
ρ(1− ρ)c−ρt = Uρc−ρt (10)
∂U
∂ct+1
=
∂U
∂Rt(ct+1)
∂Rt(ct+1)
∂ct+1
(11)
=Uρ [Rt(ct+1)]
−ρ [Rt(ct+1)]
γ c−γt+1
=Uρ [Rt(ct+1)]
γ−ρ c−γt+1.
Using eq.(10) and (11), IMRS or Qt,t+1, which equals to U2/U1, has the following closed form
solution.
Qt,t+1 ≡U
ρ [Rt(ct+1)]
γ−ρ c−γt+1
Uρc−ρt
=
[
ct+1
ct
]−ρ [
ct+1
Rt(ct+1)
]ρ−γ
.
Replacing ct+1 and ct with ϕt+1mt + τt+1 + εt+1 and ϕtmt respectively brings about
Qt,t+1(mt, εt+1) in Lemma 2. Lastly, Et [(ϕt+1mt + τt+1 + εt+1)
1−γ] can be easily computed
using U(y − b, y + b).
Et
[
(h(mt) + εt+1)
1−γ] = ∫ y+b
y−b
(h(mt) + εt+1)
1−γ 1
2b
dεt+1 (12)
=
1
2b(2− γ)(h(mt) + y + b)
(2−γ) − (h(mt) + y − b)(2−γ).
Q.E.D.
Proof for Proposition 1
We first prove the existence and uniqueness of ZEZ . The FOC in equilibrium becomes
26
as follows.
lnµ− ρ ln (x− Z) + γ ln (Z + y) =γ − ρ
1− γ
{
ln
[
(Z + y + b)2−γ − (Z + y − b)2−γ
2b(2− γ)
]}
LHS(Z) =RHS(Z).
It’s easy to see that LHS ′ > 0, and limZ→x =∞. Now, RHS ′ has the following form.
RHS ′ = (γ − ρ)
{
(Z + y + b)1−γ − (Z + y − b)1−γ
1− γ
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
{
(Z + y + b)2−γ − (Z + y − b)2−γ
2− γ
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
.
This implies that RHS ′ < 0 (RHS ′ > 0) if ρ > γ (ρ < γ). Since the case 2 is based on
ρ > γ, RHS ′ < 0. Thus, as long as LHS(0) ≤ RHS(0), ∃!ZEZ . This proves the existence
and uniqueness under lnµ < µ¯.
Next, we prove why ZEZ > ZSP . For this it suffices to show, first, ZEZ |b=0,µ=1 is equal
to or greater than ZSP , and second, ∂ZEZ/∂b > 0. The first condition is easy to show from
eq.(4). That is Z + y = x − Z, which implies ZEZ = (x − y)/2 ≡ ZSP . Second condition
requires us to use Implicit Function Theorem (IFT) as follows.
∂ZEZ
∂b
= − ∂G/∂b
∂G/∂ZEZ
,
where
∂G
∂ZEZ
=
ρ
x− ZEZ +
γ
ZEZ + y
−RHS ′ > 0 if ρ > γ.
and
∂G
∂b
=− γ − ρ
1− γ
{
(2− γ)(ZEZ + y + b)
1−γ − (ZEZ + y − b)1−γ
(ZEZ + y + b)2−γ − (ZEZ + y − b)2−γ −
1
b
}
≡ −γ − ρ
1− γH.
Now, we prove that H is always positive (negative) given that γ > 1 (γ < 1). First, given
γ > 1 and U(y − b, y + b),
Et
[
(ZEZ + εt+1)
1−γ] < (ZEZ + y − b)1−γ + (ZEZ + y − b)1−γ
2
.
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From eq.(12), this inequality can be re-expressed as below.
(ZEZ + y − b)2−γ + (ZEZ + y − b)2−γ
2b(2− γ) <
(ZEZ + y − b)1−γ + (ZEZ + y − b)1−γ
2
,
1
b
< (2− γ)(ZEZ + y + b)
1−γ − (ZEZ + y − b)1−γ
(ZEZ + y + b)2−γ − (ZEZ + y − b)2−γ .
When γ < 1, all inequality signs so far get reversed. This proves why H > 0(H < 0) when
γ > 1(γ < 1). Consequently,
∂G
∂b
{
> 0 if ρ < γ
< 0 if ρ > γ.
(13)
Combine this with ∂G/∂ZEZ > 0 under ρ > γ. Then, finally ∂ZEZ/∂b > 0, and ZEZ > ZSP .
∂ZEZ/∂µ < 0 can be easily proved using the IFT as below.
∂ZEZ
∂µ
= − ∂G/∂µ
∂G/∂ZEZ
= − 1/µρ
x−ZEZ +
γ
ZEZ+y
−RHS ′ < 0, if ρ > γ.
Lastly, µ∗ is µ such that G((x − y)/2, µ, x, y, b) = 0. The fact that µ∗ > 1 comes from
ZEZ |µ=1 > ZSP and ∂ZEZ/∂µ < 0. Given the closed form solution to µ∗ as well as ρ > γ,
∂µ∗/∂b > 0 and ∂µ∗/∂y < 0 are straightforward. Q.E.D.
Proof for Proposition 2
When ρ < γ, RHS ′ > 0 and RHS(x) is a finite real number. Thus, as long as LHS(0) ≤
RHS(0), ∃!ZEZ . This proves the existence and uniqueness under lnµ < µ¯. If instead
LHS(0) ≥ RHS(0) then, depending on the slope of RHS there could be multiple ZEZ or
non ZEZ , and therefore, multiple monetary equilibrium or non-monetary equilibrium.
Next, we prove why ZEZ < ZSP under the unique stationary monetary equilibrium case.
For this it suffices to show, first, ZEZ |b=0,µ=1 is equal to or less than ZSP , and second,
∂ZEZ/∂b < 0. The first condition is easy to show from eq.(4). That is Z + y = x−Z, which
implies ZEZ = (x − y)/2 ≡ ZSP . Second condition requires us to use Implicit Function
Theorem (IFT) as follows.
∂ZEZ
∂b
= − ∂G/∂b
∂G/∂ZEZ
,
Since we know ∂G/∂b > 0 from eq.(13) we only need to know the sign of ∂G/∂ZEZ . But we
know for sure that ∂ZEZ/∂µ < 0 since a higher µ would only shift the LHS upward. This
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implies ∂G/∂ZEZ > 0 because
∂ZEZ
∂µ
= − ∂G/∂µ
∂G/∂ZEZ
= − 1/µ
∂G/∂ZEZ
< 0.
Thus, ∂ZEZ/∂b < 0, and therefore ZEZ < ZSP . Finally, the fact that the Friedman rule
does not achieve the ZSP under b > 0 can be easily seen through ZEZ |b=0,µ=1 = ZSP and
∂ZEZ/∂b < 0. Further, due to ∂ZEZ/∂µ < 0 the Friedman rule achieves the second-best.
Q.E.D.
Proof for Proposition 3
We begin with proving the existence and uniqueness of {ZcEZ , ZsEZ}. We define a function
f(ZcEZ) such that f(Z
c
EZ) equals to Z
s
EZ solving for eq.(9) given Z
c
EZ . Given that the LHS of
e.q.(9) is increasing in ZsEZ and the RHS of eq.(9) is invariant to Z
s
EZ , it is easy to see that
this function f(ZcEZ) exists only if ρ ln (x− ZcEZ) > γ ln (ZcEZ + y) + (ρ− γ) lnR(ZcEZ + y),
which in turn holds true as long as eq.(8) holds true. This also implies that f(ZcEZ) <
x,∀ZcEZ ≤ x. Next, we prove f ′(ZcEZ) > 0. For this, it suffices to show that the RHS of
eq.(9) increases in ZcEZ . Since ρ > γ and the certainty equivalent of future consumption
value, i.e., R(y +ZcEZ), is decreasing in Z
c
EZ , the RHS of eq.(9) is indeed increasing in Z
c
EZ .
Lastly, by replacing ZcEZ with 0 one can get
f(0) = exp
{
γ
ρ
ln (y) +
ρ− γ
ρ
ln [R(y)]
}
> 0.
By replacing R(y) with structural parameters as in eq.(12), one can finally get f(0) in
Proposition 3.
Similar to f(ZcEZ), we also define g(Z
s
EZ) such that g(Z
s
EZ) equals to Z
c
EZ solving for eq.(8)
given ZsEZ . Note that the LHS of eq.(8) is increasing in Z
c
EZ with LHS|ZcEZ=x−ZsEZ → ∞
and the RHS of eq.(8) is decreasing in Zc. Therefore, the function g(ZsEZ) exists only if
lnµ < (γ − ρ) ln (R(y))− γ ln (y) + ρ ln (x− ZsEZ |ZcEZ=0). (14)
By replacing R(y) and ZsEZ |ZcEZ=0 with the one in the f(ZcEZ) and f(0) respectively, one
could finally get the p¯i in Proposition 3. Next, we prove g′(ZsEZ) < 0. For this, it suffices
to show that the LHS of eq.(8) increases in ZsEZ , which is trivial. Moreover, g(0) is a finite
real number and less than x due to eq.(14) and LHS|ZcEZ=x−ZsEZ → ∞ from eq.(8). Also,
g−1(0) > f(0) due to eq.(14) and the fact that g−1(0) must satisfy the following.
lnµ = (γ − ρ) ln (R(y))− γ ln (y) + ρ ln (x− g−1(0)).
29
The fact that g−1(0) < x is trivial. In sum, this proves that ∃! ZcEZ and ∃! ZsEZ , only if
lnµ < p¯i. Graphically, the unique equilibrium can be illustrated as below. Figure 5 greatly
Figure 5: A unique stationary equilibrium
ZcEZ
0
ZsEZ
x
g−1(0)
f(0)
xg(0)
f(ZcEZ)
g(ZsEZ)
helps us understand various comparative static analyses intuitively. First, g(ZsEZ) shifts
inward in response to an increase in µ. This is easily understood since the LHS of eq.(8)
increases in µ, which in turn causes ZcEZ to fall given every level of Z
s
EZ . Plus, changes in µ
have no effect on the f(ZcEZ). Altogether, this confirms ∂Z
s
EZ/µ < 0 and ∂Z
c
EZ/µ < 0.
g(ZsEZ) shifts outward in response to an increase in b. Again, this can be understood
from eq.(8). Only the RHS of the equation increases in b due to ρ > γ and the fact that
R(y) falls as b increases. f(ZcEZ) also shifts outward as b increases. From the RHS of the
eq.(9) with ρ > γ and ∂R(y)/∂b < 0 one can easily see that ZsEZ should fall given every level
of ZcEZ when b increases. This proves ∂Z
c
EZ/∂b > 0.
As for the ∂ZsEZ/∂b, the graphical interpretation is limited since both curves shifts out-
ward. Thus, we exploit the Cramer’s rule. First, we define V (b, ZcEZ , Z
s
EZ) as LHS of eq.(8)
minus RHS of eq.(8), while W (b, ZcEZ , Z
s
EZ) as LHS of eq.(9) minus RHS of eq.(9).
∂ZsEZ
∂b
=
∣∣∣∣∣ −
∂V
∂b
∂V
∂ZcEZ
−∂W
∂b
∂W
∂ZcEZ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ −
∂V
∂ZsEZ
∂V
∂ZcEZ
− ∂W
∂ZsEZ
∂W
∂ZcEZ
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣ ⊕ ⊕	 	
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ⊕ ⊕⊕ 	
∣∣∣∣∣
=
−∂V
∂b
∂W
∂ZcEZ
+ ∂V
∂ZcEZ
∂W
∂b
	 < 0, if ρ > γ. (15)
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Equation (15) follows from below.
∂V
∂b
= (ρ− γ)∂R(b)/∂b
R(b)
{
> 0 if ρ < γ
< 0 if ρ > γ.
∂W
∂b
= −(ρ− γ)
ρ
∂R(b)/∂b
R(b)
{
< 0 if ρ < γ
> 0 if ρ > γ.
∂V
∂ZcEZ
=
ρ
x− ZcEZ − ZsEZ
+
γ
ZcEZ + y
+ (ρ− γ)∂R(Z
c
EZ)/∂Z
c
EZ
R(ZcEZ)
{
ambiguous if ρ < γ
> 0 if ρ > γ.
∂W
∂ZcEZ
= − γ
ρ(ZcEZ + y)
− (ρ− γ)
ρ
∂R(ZcEZ)/∂Z
c
EZ
R(ZcEZ)
{
ambiguous if ρ < γ
< 0 if ρ > γ.
∂V
∂ZsEZ
=
ρ
x− ZcEZ − ZsEZ
.
∂W
∂ZsEZ
=
1
ZsEZ
.
−∂V
∂b
∂W
∂ZcEZ
+
∂V
∂ZcEZ
∂W
∂b
= −(ρ− γ) ∂R(b)/∂b
(x− ZcEZ − ZsEZ)R(b)
{
< 0 if ρ < γ
> 0 if ρ > γ.
As for the effect of inflation on general goods consumed by young workers, ∂cy,EZ/∂µ >
0 follows easily from ∂ZsEZ/µ < 0 and ∂Z
c
EZ/µ < 0. ∂cy,EZ/∂b < 0 follows from two
facts. First, a higher inflation reduces special goods consumed by old shoppers in stationary
equilibrium, i.e., ∂ZsEZ/∂µ < 0. Second, the marginal utility from consuming general goods
by young workers should equal to that from consuming special goods by old shoppers in
stationary equilibrium, i.e., eq.(8) and (9).
Lastly, the fact that the Friedman rule couldn’t achieve the constrained efficient allocation
can be understood with Figure 5. The constrained efficient allocation can be thought of a
point where g and f functions intercept each other when µ = 1 and b = 0. As explained
before, as soon as b exceeds 0, both g and f functions shift outwards. However, changes in
µ can only shift the g curve in Figure 5. Thus, the initial equilibrium point can never be
restored by changes in µ in any direction. To figure out the (second-best) optimal inflation
rate in this case, we construct a social welfare function, W , as the sum (with equal weights)
of all agents’ net utilities in a unique stationary monetary equilibrium.
W = (c1−ρy,EZ + s1−ρEZ + c1−ρo,EZ)1/(1−ρ) .
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Then the first derivative of W with respect to µ is given by
∂W
∂µ
=
(
c1−ρy,EZ + s
1−ρ
EZ + c
1−ρ
o,EZ
)1/(1−ρ)
s−ρEZ ∂sEZ∂µ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+c−ρy,EZ
∂cy,EZ
∂µ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+c−ρo,EZ
∂co,EZ
∂µ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
 ,
and ambiguous. Q.E.D.
Proof for Proposition 4
Similar to Proposition 3, we begin with a proof for the existence and uniqueness of
{ZcEZ , ZsEZ}. Now, we define f(ZcEZ) as before. Following the proof for Proposition 3,
f(ZcEZ) exists, and f(Z
c
EZ) < x,∀ZcEZ ≤ x. For f ′(ZcEZ) > 0, one would have to confirm
that the RHS of eq.(9) is increasing in ZcEZ even if ρ < γ. This is easy to show since
ln (ZcEZ) > ln (R(Z
c
EZ + y)). The properties of g(Z
s
EZ) are same as in Proposition 3. In sum,
this proves that ∃! ZcEZ and ∃! ZsEZ , only if lnµ < p¯i. Graphically, the unique equilibrium
can be still illustrated by Figure 5.
Now, we prove various comparative static analyses. First, the fact that g(ZsEZ) shifts
inward in response to an increase in µ and ∂ZsEZ/µ < 0 and ∂Z
c
EZ/µ < 0 follows the same
proof as in Proposition 3.
What is different from the previous proposition is that g(ZsEZ), this time, shifts inward
in response to an increase in b. Again, this can be understood from eq.(8). Only the RHS of
the equation decreases in b due to ρ < γ and the fact that R(y) falls as b increases. f(ZcEZ)
also shifts inward as b increases. From the RHS of the eq.(9) with ρ < γ and ∂R(y)/∂b < 0
one can easily see that ZsEZ should increase given every level of Z
c
EZ when b increases. This
proves ∂ZcEZ/∂b < 0.
As for the ∂ZsEZ/∂b, the graphical interpretation is limited since both curves shifts in-
ward. Thus, we exploit the Cramer’s rule. As in the proof for Proposition 3, we define
V (b, ZcEZ , Z
s
EZ) as LHS of eq.(8) minus RHS of eq.(8), while W (b, Z
c
EZ , Z
s
EZ) as LHS of
eq.(9) minus RHS of eq.(9).
∂ZsEZ
∂b
=
∣∣∣∣∣ −
∂V
∂b
∂V
∂ZcEZ
−∂W
∂b
∂W
∂ZcEZ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ −
∂V
∂ZsEZ
∂V
∂ZcEZ
− ∂W
∂ZsEZ
∂W
∂ZcEZ
∣∣∣∣∣
=
−∂V
∂b
∂W
∂ZcEZ
+ ∂V
∂ZcEZ
∂W
∂b
∂V
∂ZsEZ
∂W
∂ZcEZ
− ∂W
∂ZsEZ
∂V
∂ZcEZ
> 0, if ρ < γ. (16)
In eq.(16), the numerator becomes negative if ρ < γ. This follows from the previous propo-
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sition’s proof. The denominator is given by
∂V
∂ZsEZ
∂W
∂ZcEZ
− ∂W
∂ZsEZ
∂V
∂ZcEZ
=
−ρ
ZsEZ(x− ZcEZ − ZsEZ)
− 1
x− ZcEZ − ZsEZ
[
γ
ZcEZ + y
− ∂R(Z
c
EZ + y)/∂Z
c
EZ
R(ZcEZ + y)
(γ − ρ)
]
− 1
ZsEZ
[
γ
ZcEZ + y
− ∂R(Z
c
EZ + y)/∂Z
c
EZ
R(ZcEZ + y)
(γ − ρ)
]
< 0 if R(ZcEZ + y) > (∂R(Z
c
EZ + y)/∂Z
c
EZ)(Z
c
EZ + y)
where the last condition holds due to the concavity of the R function. Lastly, proofs for state-
ments regarding the optimal inflation rate are identical to those in the proof for Proposition
3. Q.E.D.
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